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Security of supply and retail competition
in the European gas market.
Some model-based insights
Ibrahim ABADA∗, Olivier MASSOL†.
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the impact of uncertain disruptions in gas supply upon gas
retailer contracting behavior and consequent price and welfare implications in a gas
market characterized by long-term gas contracts using a static Cournot model. In or-
der to most realistically describe the economical situation, our representation divides
the market into two stages: the upstream market that links, by means of long-term
contracts, producers in exporting countries (Russia, Algeria, etc.) to local retailers
who bring gas to the consuming countries to satisfy local demands in the downstream
market. Disruption costs are modeled using short-run demand functions. First we
mathematically develop a general model and write the associated KKT conditions,
then we propose some case studies, under iso-elasticity assumptions, for the long-
short-run inverse-demand curves in order to predict qualitatively and quantitatively
the impacts of supply disruptions on Western European gas trade. In the second part,
we study in detail the German gas market of the 1980s to explain the supply choices of
the German retailer, and we derive interesting conclusions and insights concerning the
amounts and prices of natural gas brought to the market. The last part of the paper
is dedicated to a study of the Bulgarian gas market, which is greatly dependent on the
Russian gas supplies and hence very sensitive to interruption risks. Some interesting
conclusions are derived concerning the necessity to economically regulate the market,
by means of gas amounts control, if the disruption probability is high enough.
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1 Introduction
The security of energy supply is all but a new concern for energy importing countries.
However, this concern has certainly been rising in importance since the 1970s. It is not
anticipated that this trend is going to stop as an increasing dependence on imported energy
is expected in the coming decades (International Energy Agency, 2008). Among the diﬀer-
ent energy sources, natural gas constitutes a particular case that attracts a lot of attention.
In this paper, though we focus explicitly on the European situation, the framework devel-
oped herein remains general and can be adapted to analyze the situation of large importing
countries (such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, India, to name but a few) without
loss of generality. Nowadays, there are several factors at work which explain the rekindling
debate on the security of gas supplies in those countries. Firstly, on the supply side: a
growing reliance on imports over longer distances is observed and a signiﬁcant increase in
the concentration of foreign supplies is expected for some regions like Europe (Costantini et
al., 2006). Secondly, speculations about the future behavior of the Gas Exporting Countries
Forum (GECF) refer to a possible cartelization (Massol and Tchung-Ming, 2009). Thirdly,
the recent supply interruptions observed in a number of OECD regions (IEA, 2007) suggest
that, whatever the causes (international tensions, terrorism or technical hazards impacting
unreliable infrastructures), low but positive probabilities of interruption have to be consid-
ered as likely risks. And, last but not least, natural gas plays an ever increasing role in the
energy mix: in most OECD countries, natural gas is the fastest growing fuel in the power
generation mixes. Given the rigidities of power generation in the short-run, this growing
interdependence between gas and electricity also raises concerns about both the security
and the reliability of electricity supplies (IEA, 2007).
Before going further, we need to discuss how the downstream part of the gas industry
usually manages the possible shortfall in upstream gas. Possible remedies include: large-
scale commercial storage, strategic "stockpiles" (if any), re-routing of existing gas ﬂows,
increased production from other suppliers that may compensate the shortfall of others. In
any case, these instruments might be unavailable. For example, local geological conditions
can impede the construction of large underground gas storages (e.g. Belgium), capacity
constraints on existing transmission networks can prevent the suitable re-routing of exist-
ing gas ﬂows (e.g. South Eastern European countries), local production can be inexistent
(e.g. Bulgaria). Until now, strategic stockpiling, a well-known measure implemented to
increase the security of oil supplies (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1977; Murphy et al., 1987),
has not been viewed as a workable solution in the case of natural gas supplies (IEA, 2007,
pp. 67-83). Now, the possibility to create some kind of precautionary storage is currently
being discussed in Europe. However, given the costs of these measures, it is not certain
that the stored volumes will be suﬃcient to fully replace the disrupted supplies. As a result
of these disruptions, retailers may have no alternative but to pass along the shortfall to
end-users through selective interruptions. In this paper, we analyze how these disruptions
inﬂuence the retailers' contracting behavior since they can try to minimize the impact of
those interruptions using diversiﬁed import sources.
Because of this perceived vulnerability, the security of gas supplies has inspired a huge
amount of literature that can be roughly divided into two categories. The ﬁrst one is by
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far the largest and gathers all the contributions dominated by purely geopolitical concerns.1
The second category uses a microeconomic framework to analyze energy security. Apart
some rare contributions (e.g. Manne et al. 1986; Hoel and Strøm, 1987; Markandya and
Pemberton, 2010), the literature dedicated to the particular case of the gas industry is not
tremendously developed. Moreover, most of these contributions refer to a now outdated
institutional context. Until the 1990s, the European natural gas industry was subject to
government regulations and controls. In most countries, regulated state-owned or state-
controlled corporations were responsible for most of the purchase, transport and sale of
natural gas to the distributors.2 As far as economic analysis is concerned, the decisions
of those ﬁrms regarding supply security were captured in Manne and al. (1986) or Hoel
and Strøm (1987). From an economic policy perspective, this previous organization was
suspected to provide a "cosy arrangement": import contracts did not matter because the
rate-of-return regulation provided a guarantor that costs would be met and, hence, the
guarantor would not be potentially stranded (Helm, 2002).
Following the UK's liberalization and privatization reforms of the late 1980s (e.g. Vickers
and Yarrow, 1988; Newbery, 2000), a complete transformation of the regulatory regime
started in Continental Europe in the early 2000s. Non-discriminatory access provisions to
the gas infrastructures (transportation, storage and LNG terminals) were introduced so
as to guarantee equal opportunities to all players (IEA, 2002). As a result, competition
emerged among importers, now privately owned ﬁrms. These ﬁrms, named retailers, pur-
chase various inputs (gas from local and foreign upstream producers, transport services
and services necessary to meet ﬂuctuations in demand) and sell gas to end-users. Cus-
tomers are no longer committed to any particular retailer, creating the conditions for a
competitive rivalry among these ﬁrms.
This reform suggests a thought-provoking research question: Does competition among
gas retailers have an inﬂuence in their choices of inputs? Framed diﬀerently, it simply
asks for an investigation of retailer's contracting behavior in a gas market dominated by
long-term import contracts. How do the retailers' contracting choices inﬂuence the market
outcomes (gas price, social welfare in the importing market, retailers proﬁts, etc.) regard-
ing the degree of supply insecurity.
In this paper, we provide an extension of the models developed by Manne and al. (1986)
and Hoel and Strøm (1987). In these contributions, the authors study the decisions taken
by a representative central gas buyer whose objective was to maximize the expected utility
of gas consumption net of the purchaser cost of buying gas. The objective functions used
here explicitly take into account possible interruptions whose occurrences are captured
thanks to perceived probabilities. Both long- and short-run issues were jointly considered.
The costs attached to each of these disruption states were valued thanks to short-run
consumer surplus concepts while both energy purchases and consumptions under normal
conditions were related to the long-run demand curve. Both papers provided a very ef-
fective formulation but captured the essence of a now outdated institutional arrangement.
Compared to these early papers, we explicitly model retailers as proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms
engaged in a Cournot competition. Section 2 presents and justiﬁes the framework devel-
1For example, several recent articles propose measures of energy security (Percebois, 2006; Lefèvre,
2010; Kruyt et al., 2010).
2In some countries (France, for example), a legal import monopoly was even granted to one particular
ﬁrm.
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oped for analyzing their import diversiﬁcation strategies. To illustrate the possibilities
oﬀered by this model, two empirical illustrations based on real case studies are succes-
sively presented and commented on sections 3 and 4. In the former, a historical analysis
of the German situation in the early 1980s is provided. In the latter, the case of South
Eastern Europe is studied to analyze the possible disruptions of the Russian imports and
the consequences on the importer's behavior. The last section concludes the paper.
2 Formulation of the problem
2.1 Preliminary remarks and notations
As this paper explicitly addresses the particularities of the Continental European gas indus-
try, some deﬁnitude is needed to justify the assumptions chosen in our theoretical model.
In this work, we assume a Cournot competition among the natural gas retailers of a given
country and we study a hypothetical long-run equilibrium. To be more speciﬁc, the model
corresponds to a static long-run equilibrium in which costs reﬂect a typical year.
Moreover, our analysis is focused on long-run aspects. The gas infrastructure required
to supply gas to end-users is not explicitly modeled. This may be interpreted as assuming
a fully accessible gas infrastructure without bottlenecks. This assumption may perfectly
reﬂect European gas infrastructure conditions in the long run, when short-run regulatory
and investment uncertainties are resolved. Thus, the retailer's costs can be summarized as
the total cost of the natural gas purchased from the diﬀerent upstream producers.
We will use these notations:
i index for retail ﬁrms in the country under study,
I the set of retailers in the country under study,
j index for upstream gas producers,
J the set of upstream gas producers.
Here we assume that all possible supply disruption states can be enumerated and we simply
note Ω the (ﬁnite) set of all these random events named ω. For simplicity, the particular
state ω of no-disruption is named 0. Whatever the disruption state ω, its occurrence can
be appraised thanks to a probability θ(ω). Obviously, we have
∑
ω∈Ω θ(ω) = 1. We also
assume that a consensus exists in the country on both the deﬁnition of the discrete set Ω
and on the value of the probability of all the diﬀerent events. Thus, those probabilities
constitute common knowledge for the retailers. This assumption seems reasonable as a
consensus is generally observed in most importing countries regarding the disruptive na-
ture of the various importing schemes. Therefore, we do not model either the individual
ﬁrms' subjective perception of the disruption risk, or the diﬀerence between real risks and
risk perceptions. From a practical perspective, applied procedures like the one presented
in Bunn and Mustafaoglu (1978) can be used to evaluate those probabilities.
We now have to explain how a retailer i ∈ I acquires its gas. We assume that there are no
wholesale markets and the volumes purchased are supposedly entirely obtained thanks to
pre-existing bilateral contracts. At ﬁrst sight, this assumption might look surprising since
the pro-competitive move of the early 2000s was expected to be accompanied by the rapid
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development of wholesale spot markets in Continental Europe (IEA, 2002). But, this emer-
gence has been far slower than expected and the long-term bilateral arrangements are still
dominant. The need for a transition period to phase out pre-existing oil products indexed
long-term contracts is not a suﬃcient ground to explain the continuing pre-eminence of
these long-term contracts. Industrial observations suggest that retailers are still ready to
engage in long-term bilateral trade. Despite early barriers to entry concerns that motivated
an in-depth sectoral analysis by the European Commission (DG COMP, 2007), those long-
term arrangements are now fully admitted by the European authorities and all juridical
actions against long-term contracts have been withdrawn.3 According to gas experts, the
dominance of long-term supplies is fading in Western Europe but this aﬃrmation does not
hold for Eastern Europe where the upstream market structure is much more concentrated.
Hereafter, we focus on the case of Eastern European gas markets.
In this paper, we do not model the competitive interactions among suppliers who compete
in both price and quality of their supplies (in this context, quality would be the security
of their supplies). As a result, we assume that the upstream prices of natural gas are set
exogeneously.4 Our assumptions are based on the results of the sectoral enquiry led by
the European Commission (DG COMP, 2007). Firstly, gas prices may diﬀer across sources
j ∈ J as evidence suggests that price indexation formulas used in long-term contracts can
diﬀer from one producer to another (DG COMP, 2007, p. 103, ﬁg. 32). Secondly, the
European Commission noted that price indexation formulas are quite homogeneous among
buyers located in a given region: either the UK, Western or Eastern Europe (DG COMP,
2007, p. 104, ﬁg. 33). Thus, we assume that price discrimination is not an issue: the price
of a given source j ∈ J is unique and proposed to all the potential buyers i ∈ I. Lastly,
this enquiry clariﬁes the price provisions used in these bilateral long-term arrangements.
In these contracts, the price of gas is settled thanks to predetermined indexation formulas
that establish a direct linkage with the wholesale spot price of oil products. Given the
limited short-run interactions among gas and oil products, we can assume that a disrup-
tion of gas supplies has no impact on the prices of oil products and hence on gas prices.
Moreover, oil products price uncertainty is not modeled here. Thus, upstream prices are
assumed to be constant across all the possible disruption states. In sum, upstream prices
can be viewed as an exogeneously determined vector of prices (pj)j∈J , where each compo-
nent corresponds to the price pj proposed by the producer j.
The amount of gas purchased by the retailers i from the producer j is named x0ij . This
quantity corresponds to the volume of gas supplied by j to i under a no-disruption state.
For a retailer, this quantity can obviously be considered as a decision variable.
Under a given disruption state ω ∈ Ω, the subgroup of producers whose supplies are
disrupted is named Sω. The quantity of gas delivered to a retailer i by a gas producer j
under a particular disruption state ω ∈ Ω is equal to xωij = (1 − δSω(j))x0ij where δSω(j)
takes the value 1 if the gas producer j belongs to the collection of disrupted producers
Sω and 0 otherwise. We observe here that the disruption state index δSω(j) attached to
the producer j does not depend on i which means that a disruption from this producer
3In fact, the conclusions of this sectoral analysis were published just after the ﬁrst Russo-Ukrainian
dispute. Thus, they emphasize the capability of long-term contracts to provide a workable solution to the
well-known "hold up" problem caused by ex post opportunism on the supply side.
4A complete discussion on the ﬁxation of this contractual price can be found in the interesting collection
of papers presented in Golombek et al. (1987).
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corresponds to a total disruption of all the volumes purchased by the diﬀerent retailers.
Stated diﬀerently, this means that there is no discrimination among retailers: if a producer
decides to cut its supplies and stop deliveries to an infrastructure then those supplies are
simultaneously cut for all the retailers. This assumption implies that either for technical
or geopolitical reasons, all retailers are aﬀected to the same degree by the disruption. It
is important to note that our framework assumes that there is no supply-side response
to a disruption: the occurrence of a disruption does not modify the behavior of the non-
disrupted producers. In particular, we do not model the ﬂexibility provisions that can
partially relieve the buyers' "Take or Pay"' obligations.
To simplify, the total amount of gas purchased and consumed under a given disruption
state ω ∈ Ω is named xω = ∑(i,j)∈I×J xωij . In particular, x0 is the total volume of gas
purchased under a no-disruption state. Similarly, we note xωi =
∑
j∈J x
ω
ij the total amount
of gas purchased by a given retailer under the state ω.
Added to that, two inverse demand functions are needed. In the following, we ﬁrst stick to
a general formulation and denote: f(k) the long-run willingness to pay for the gas where
f is twice diﬀerentiable and f ′(k) < 0, and g(k, q), the short-run willingness to pay for
quantity q, parametrically depending on the long-run consumption k. We assume that
g(k, q) is twice diﬀerentiable with ∂g/∂k > 0 and g(k, k) = f(k), (∀k ∈ R+∗). Indeed the
short-run willingness to pay for the long-run quantity is equal to the long-run willingness.
In the rest of the article k (respectively q) will denote the long (respectively short)-run
quantity of gas. We also use a dumb variable t to denote the long- or short-run volume
when needed in an integral. To begin with, the description of f and g is kept general. A
particular speciﬁcation of the inverse-demand functions will be detailed later on.
2.2 A formal representation of disruption costs
In this paper, we assume that gas retailers only sign ﬁrm supply contracts with their cus-
tomers. Moreover, we assume that the retail price of gas cannot be adjusted in the case of
a sudden short-run disruption of gas supply (cf. the discussion above on the rigidities of
the natural gas industry). Besides, consumers are supposed to ignore the possible occur-
rence of sudden disruptions. Therefore, they assume that the total contracted amount of
gas x0 will be delivered. Should there be an interruption in deliveries, we assume that a
retailer is required to make compensation payments to its disrupted customers (for exam-
ple, with claims). As we are dealing with brief events, the compensation has to take into
consideration the limited responsiveness of the short-run demand. Thus, the corresponding
consumer unease can be approximated thanks to the short-run inverse demand function.
For a disruption state ω, the total disrupted quantity is x0 − xω and the corresponding
consumers surplus variation is equal to:
∫ x0
xω g(x
0, t)dt.
Of course, retailers are free to decide their upstream supply mixes. The composition
of the input mix may thus vary from one retailer to another. In the event of a disruption,
requiring the virtuous retailers to pay for the consequences of risky choices made by others
would obviously create an incentive for the retailers to select the lowest cost, higher risk
choice of input. Such a mechanism is both unjustiﬁable and unfair. For each disruption
case, each retailer's payment to consumers is thus assumed to be set in proportion to its
own responsibility in the total disruption. Formally, it means that under a disruption
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state ω ∈ Ω\{0}, a given retailer i incurs a positive disruption cost DCi(x0, ω) equal to
the payment required to its disrupted consumers:
DCi(x0, ω) =
∑
j∈J
(x0ij − xωij)
x0 − xω
∫ x0
xω
g(x0, t)dt (1)
Besides, we assume that a retailer is not required to pay the producers involved in Sω
for the disrupted volumes of gas observed under a state ω ∈ Ω\{0}. Under that particular
state, retailer i's proﬁts are thus equal to the proﬁts earned under the no-disruption state
named 0, minus the disruption costs DCi(x0, ω) plus
∑
j∈Sω
pjx
0
ij .
2.3 The model
This section presents the agents' objectives. We reiterate that we need two inverse demand
functions. The ﬁrst one, f(k) is the long-run willingness to pay for the gas. The second,
g(k, q) is the short-run willingness to pay for quantity q, parametrically depending on the
long-run consumption k. In the following, we use a dumb variable t to denote the long- or
short-run volume when needed in an integral.
Consumer: here, the decisions of the end-users are based solely on the retail price of
gas named P ?. We assume that gas end-users strive to maximize the value received from
consumption minus the payments to retailers, assuming they cannot aﬀect P ?. Besides,
they do not take into account the propensities of possible sudden disruptions. This assump-
tion seems consistent with the industrial reality since most end-users completely ignore the
details of the supply mix decided by the retailers and know almost nothing about the ori-
gin of the natural gas they are burning. As a result, their decisions cannot consider these
disruption states. This behavior is thus represented by:
CONS(P ?): Max
∫ k
0
f(t)dt− P ?k
{k}
k ≥ 0
If the problem has an interior solution, it is characterized with levels of consumption k
by: f(k) = P ?.
Gas retailer: here, we model the contracting behavior of a risk-neutral ﬁrm. To keep
the model simple, we will not consider the case of a risk-averse ﬁrm. Thus, its optimiza-
tion problem is to choose a purchase policy (x0ij)j∈J under a no-disruption state so as to
maximize its expected proﬁt across all possible disruption states. Since we do not model
possible recourse actions in case of disruption, the only decision variables are the contrac-
tual long-term volumes decided by the retailers.
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RETAILERi:
Max Π¯i(x0ij , (x
0
lj)l 6=i) =
∑
j∈J
(
f(x0)− pj
)
x0ij −
∑
ω∈Ω\{0}
θ(ω)
DCi(x0, ω)−∑
j∈Sω
pjx
0
ij

{x0ij , j ∈ J}
x0ij ≥ 0 (∀j ∈ J)
To simplify, the retailer's i expected proﬁts can hence be rewritten as follows: Π¯i(x0i ) =
A+B + C where:
A =
∑
j∈J
(
f(x0)− pj
)
x0ij (2)
B = −
∑
ω∈Ω\{0}
θ(ω)DCi(x0, ω) (3)
C =
∑
ω∈Ω\{0}
θ(ω)
∑
j∈J
pjx
0
ijδSω(j) (4)
The partial derivative of Π¯i with respect to the decision variable x0ik is given in Appendix
1.
If the problem has an interior solution, the associated KKT conditions are:
For x0ik: 0 ≤ x0ik ⊥
∂Π¯i
∂x0ik
(x0i ) ≤ 0 (5)
where the derivative
∂Π¯i
∂x0ik
(x0i ) is given in Appendix 1. Once the KKT conditions are
written, it is possible to solve the model and ﬁnd the traders' strategic import choices.
3 Model application in two cases
The framework at hand seems suitable to capture the key elements of some of the situations
observed in the European natural gas industry. To illustrate this capability, it is worthwhile
to choose a particular functional form for the long- and short-term inverse demands. In this
section, we present some illustrations based on an iso-elasticity assumption for both the
short-run and the long-run inverse demand functions. The absolute value of the long-run
(respectively short-run) price elasticity is named 0 (respectively 1).
3.1 The iso-elasticity assumption
Here we follow Manne and al. (1986) and Hoel and Strøm (1987) and assume that, in
the long-run, the inverse demand function is f(k) = ak−
1
0 where a is a non-negative
parameter and k represents the long-run consumption amount. As a result, the short-
run demand function associated with this particular long-run consumption k is given by
g(k, q) = ak
1
 q
− 1
1 where q is the amount of natural gas eﬀectively consumed in the short-
run and  is a parameter deﬁned so that:
∀k ∈ R g(k, k) = f(k). (6)
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Thus, we have:
1

=
1
1
− 1
0
(7)
We also assume that the long-run inverse demand is more elastic than the short-run one,
i.e. 0 > 1.
After some algebraic developments, we derive the KKT conditions for each retailer i:
∀k ∈ J, 0 ≤ x0ik ⊥(α+ β + γ + η) ≤ 0 (8)
where
α = x0 − 1
0
x0i (9)
β = −pk (1−Θ(k)) x0
(
1+ 1
0
)
a
(10)
γ = −x0
(
1
1
)
1
1−1
1

∑
ω∈Ω
θ(ω)
x0i − xωi
x0 − xω
(
x0
(
− 1
1
+1
)
− xω
(
− 1
1
+1
))
−x0
(
1
1
+1
) ∑
ω∈Ω\k/∈Sω
θ(ω)
x0i − xωi
x0 − xω
(
x0
(
− 1
1
)
− xω
(
− 1
1
)) (11)
η = −x0
(
1
1
+1
)
1
1−1
∑
ω∈Ω\k∈Sω
θ(ω)
(x0 − xω)− (x0i − xωi )
(x0 − xω)2
(
x0
(
− 1
1
+1
)
− xω
(
− 1
1
+1
))
−x0
∑
ω∈Ω\k∈Sω
θ(ω)
x0i − xωi
x0 − xω .
(12)
Here, Θ(k) is simply
∑
{ω∈Ω,k∈Sω} θ(ω), the overall probability that producer k cuts its
supplies.
This setting allows us to study some interesting situations observed in the European nat-
ural gas industry. The coming subsections present some of these simple case studies.
3.2 Case 1: The German situation in the 1980s
Hoel and Strøm (1987) were the ﬁrst to analyze the diversiﬁcation issue in Continental
Europe before the liberalization reforms described earlier. But even if we limit ourselves
to the situation observed during the mid-1980s, there could be some doubt of the ability
of this model to fully represent the situation observed in the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG), the largest gas importing country in Europe at that time. In Hoel and Strøm
(1987), a representative gas buyer decides jointly its purchase of gas and its long-run ca-
pacity level so as to maximize the expected utility of gas consumption net of the purchaser
cost of buying gas. Such an argument seemed reasonable for countries where price reg-
ulation consciously limited the proﬁtability of monopoly importers. As was the case for
Distrigaz in Belgium or Gaz de France (Radetzki,1992, p.99). But in the FRG, Ruhrgas
AG, a privately-owned ﬁrm, was not explicitly regulated and earned comfortable proﬁts.5
5Ruhrgas returned a net proﬁt of between 16% and 19% of its own capital between 1984 and 1988.
Those proﬁt levels were particularly comfortable compared to those exhibited by both Distrigas and Gaz
de France (Radetzki, 1992, p.99).
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As mentioned above, these early models posited a quasi-virtuous behavior for the importer;
an assumption that hardly captures Ruhrgas's past behavior.6 A proﬁt-maximizing be-
havior looks more appropriate to model Ruhrgas at that time.
In the following, we study the decisions made by Ruhrgas in the early-1970s regarding
future imports planned for the 1980s. At that time, Ruhrgas knew that the small volumes
of natural gas produced in the FRG and the much larger volumes of gas imported from the
Netherlands would be insuﬃcient to serve the future demand. Those volumes had already
been purchased under pre-existing long-term bilateral agreements and were considered as
both known and ﬁxed in the coming decade. Thus, imports from two resource-rich coun-
tries, Norway and the USSR, had to be considered to serve this future demand. Here,
we assume perfect foresight and apply the previous model to analyze Ruhrgas's decision.
Ruhrgas's objective was to select its import policy so as to maximize its expected proﬁt
for a typical year in the 1980s.
We assume that there is only one large retailer, I = {1}. For simplicity, the index i = 1
is dropped in the following formulas. The volumes coming from either the Netherlands or
the local FRG production are assumed to be kept constant whatever the circumstances
and are simply named l. The supplies from these two sources located within the EEC
were perceived as secure. Both are thus characterized by a zero probability of a disruption.
Hence, the Ruhrgas decision can be simpliﬁed as choosing the imported volumes (xj)j∈J
from a set of two sources J = {1, 2} where Norway is indexed 1 and the USSR is indexed
2. We assume that both for Norway and the USSR, there is a non-negligible risk of dis-
ruptive behavior. We denote by θ1 (respectively θ2) the disruption probability of Norway
(respectively the USSR) and p1, p2 the prices charged by these producers. For Ruhrgas,
the optimization problem is:
Max Π¯(x1, x2)
x1 ≥ 0 x2 ≥ 0
where
Π¯(x1, x2) = f(x0 + l)(x0 + l)− p1x1 − p2x2 − θ1(1− θ2)
∫ x0+l
x2+l
g(x0, t)dt
−θ2(1− θ1)
∫ x0+l
x1+l
g(x0, t)dt− θ1θ2
∫ x0+l
l
g(x0, t)dt
+θ1(1− θ2)p1x1 + θ2(1− θ1)p2x2 + θ1θ2(p1x1 + p2x2)
(13)
x1 (resp. x2) is the quantity bought by the retailer from Norway (resp. the USSR) and
x0 = x1 +x2. The local production level is assumed to be well-known. Hence, the variable
l is not a decision variable. With an iso-elastic demand, we can calculate easily Π(x1, x2).
6Ruhrgas's prices were so high at that time that BASF, the largest gas user in Germany, decided to
actively search for alternative supplies to bypass the monopoly. This situation led BASF to create an
alternative gas retailer, Wingas (established as a joint-venture with the Russian Gazprom), and led them
to play a major role in the construction of an import infrastructure between Russia and Germany (Victor
and Victor, 2006).
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Π¯(x1, x2) = µ(x0 + l)
− 1
0
+1
+ν(x0 + l)
1

(
θ1(1− θ2)(x2 + l)−
1
1
+1 + θ2(1− θ1)(x1 + l)−
1
1
+1 + θ1θ2l
− 1
1
+1
)
−(1− θ1)p1x1 − (1− θ2)p2x2
(14)
where
µ = a
(
1− (θ1 + θ2 − θ1θ2) 1
1 − 1
)
(15)
ν = a
1
1 − 1 . (16)
We can show that the proﬁt is a concave function of the variables x1 and x2. Hence the
existence and uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed.
The proﬁt's gradient depends on the variables as follows:
∂Π¯
∂x1
(x1, x2) =
(
1− 10
)
µ(x0 + l)
− 1
0
+ν (x0 + l)
1

−1
(
θ1(1− θ2)(x2 + l)−
1
1
+1 + θ2(1− θ1)(x1 + l)−
1
1
+1 + θ1θ2l
− 1
1
+1
)
+ν(x0 + l)
1

(
1− 11
)
θ2(1− θ1)(x1 + l)−
1
1 − (1− θ1)p1
(17)
∂Π¯
∂x2
(x1, x2) =
(
1− 10
)
µ(x0 + l)
− 1
0
+ν (x0 + l)
1

−1
(
θ1(1− θ2)(x2 + l)−
1
1
+1 + θ2(1− θ1)(x1 + l)−
1
1
+1 + θ1θ2l
− 1
1
+1
)
+ν(x0 + l)
1

(
1− 11
)
θ1(1− θ2)(x2 + l)−
1
1 − (1− θ2)p2.
(18)
We cannot ﬁnd simple analytical expressions of the optimal imports x1 and x2 that guar-
antee a maximum proﬁt for the German company. Hence, we have to use numerical means
to solve our two-dimensional problem. Let us assume for instance that θ1 = 0, which is to
say that the Norwegian supply is secure and θ2 > 0. It would be interesting to study the
economic conditions that make the German retailer choose its supplies exclusively from the
secure supplier. These conditions obviously take into account the relative gas prices and
the disruption probability. We can derive in this situation simple conditions that ensure
the equilibrium gas amount to be xeq1 > 0 and x
eq
2 = 0. In that situation, using the KKT
theorem, we can derive that:
(x0 + l)eq = (x1 + l)eq
∂Π¯
∂x1
(xeq1 , x
eq
2 ) = 0
∂Π¯
∂x2
(xeq1 , x
eq
2 ) ≤ 0.
(19)
Hence, we can calculate xeq1 and ﬁnd conditions on the parameters θ2, p1 and p2 so that
xeq2 = 0:
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xeq1 + l =
(
p1
a
(
1− 1
0
)
)−0
l ≤
(
p1
a
(
1− 1
0
)
)−0
(1− θ2)
(
p1 − p2
(
1− 10
))
≤ p10
(20)
Therefore, if the Norwegian supply is assumed to be secure and the local supply is such as
l ≤
(
p1
a
(
1− 1
0
)
)−0
, no Soviet gas is to be brought to FRG if (and only if):
p2 >
p1
1− 1
0
the Soviet Gas is too expensive or
p2 ≤ p11− 1
0
and θ2 > θlim2 = 1− p1
0
(
p1−p2
(
1− 1
0
)) the Soviet supply is too risky.
(21)
We can now run some numerical simulations for a given set of values for the problem's
parameters. Here, the following values were used: 0 = 1.2, 1 = 0.3, a = 10 and l = 0.04
in arbitrary units. The values of the long- and short-run elasticities are those used in
Manne et al. (1986).
To keep the discussion general, this numerical study has been conducted using arbitrary
units for the prices and volumes.
Figure 1 gives the evolution of θlim2 over the Norwegian gas price p1 for p2 = 5 in arbitrary
units. This function increases with the price p1, for it may become interesting to buy risky
gas if the secure option becomes very expensive.
Figure 2 gives the evolution of the amounts xeq1 and x
eq
2 over θ2 for p1 = 6, p2 = 2, in
arbitrary units. θ1 takes the value 0. It is reasonable to assume that the secure gas is
more expensive than the insecure one. Otherwise Germany would not have any incentive
to purchase the riskiest gas.7
For θ1 = 0, we notice that if the probability of a Soviet disruption remains moderate
(θ2 < 0.12), then the Soviet gas becomes attractive and has a strictly positive share in the
Ruhrgas supply mix. Whereas, if θ2 > 0.12, the cost of the possible disruptions induces a
relative shift towards the Norwegian gas and the Soviet gas becomes too risky (xeq2 = 0).
In that situation, the amount bought from Norway no longer depends on the disruption
probability θ2.
Figure 3 represents the dependence of the gas price in the FRG market on the disruption
probability of the Soviet gas θ2 for θ1 = 0, p1 = 6, and p2 = 2.
Obviously, the price charged by the retailer increases with θ2 to balance the possible impact
of any gas disruption and reduce its inherent costs. Besides, for θ2 > 0.12, the retailer
does not buy anymore gas from the USSR and there is, in that case, no risk of disruption.
7Obviously, the validity of this assertion is subject to the availability of an appropriate transmission
infrastructure. This point lies beyond the scope of this article that assumes no infrastructure constraints.
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Figure 1:
Evolution of θlim2 over p1 (arbitrary unit). p2 = 5 (arbitrary unit), θ1 = 0.
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Evolution of xeq1,2 over θ2 (arbitrary unit). p1 = 6, p2 = 2, θ1 = 0.
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Evolution of the price over θ2 (arbitrary units). p1 = 6, p2 = 2, θ1 = 0.
Hence, the price in the market no longer depends on θ2.
From a social welfare perspective, one can wonder whether it would be better to deal with
risky producers if their selling price is low. Therefore, it may be interesting to study the
impact of disruption on the retailer's proﬁt and on the social welfare observed in the FRG.
The expected social welfare obtained in West GermanyWFRG can be measured as the sum
of the surplus obtained by the German consumers Sc and the expected proﬁt obtained by
the sole retailer:
WFRG(x1, x2) = Sc(x1, x2) + Π¯(x1, x2) (22)
where the consumer surplus is :
Sc(x1, x2) =
∫ x0+l
0 f(t)dt− f(x0 + l)(x0 + l) (23)
Therefore:
WFRG(x1, x2) = a
1
0 − 1(x0 + l)
1− 1
0 + Π¯(x1, x2). (24)
The retailer's proﬁt is given by expression (14).
Figure 4 shows how the retailer's proﬁt and the social welfare evolve with θ2 when p1 = 6,
p2 = 2 (arbitrary units) and θ1 = 0.
The proﬁt decreases with the disruption probability, which suggests that it is better for the
retailer to deal with secure gas suppliers. This preference is also suitable for the consumer:
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Figure 4:
Evolution of the proﬁt and social welfare over θ2 (arbitrary unit). p1 = 6, p2 = 2
(arbitrary units), θ1 = 0.
15
the social welfare decreases with the disruption probability.
It is now time to make a comparison between our model and the situation studied in Manne
and al. (1986). In their paper, they described Ruhrgas as a social welfare-maximizing ﬁrm.
We can easily study this situation in our iso-elasticity framework: the retailer optimization
program is given as follows:
Max WFRG(x1, x2) = a0−1(x0 + l)
1− 1
0 + Π¯(x1, x2)
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0
Π¯(x1, x2) ≥ 0.
 2
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Figure 5:
Evolution of the proﬁt and social welfare over θ2 (arbitrary unit). p1 = 6, p2 = 2
(arbitrary units), θ1 = 0, welfare-maximizing agent.
Figure 5 gives the evolution of Ruhrgas's proﬁt Π¯ and the social welfare WFRG over the
Russian disruption probability θ2. Here, we notice that the retailer's proﬁt is always equal
to 0 and social welfare decreases with the disruption probability. Therefore, since it is
known that Ruhrgas earned a signiﬁcant proﬁt in the 1980s (Radetzki, 1992), we think
that it is more reasonable to model its behavior using a proﬁt-maximizing perspective.
Figure 6 gives the evolutions of the equilibrium quantities xeq1 and x
eq
2 over the disruption
probability θ2 in the social welfare maximizer framework. The main diﬀerence one can
notice in comparison to the proﬁt-maximizing situation is that there is no threshold eﬀect.
Indeed, there is always some risky gas which is imported even if the disruption probability
is high. However xeq2 decreases with θ2.
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An interesting lesson can be derived from this analysis: the import behavior of a tightly
regulated monopoly signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the one chosen by a proﬁt-maximizing one.
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Figure 6:
Evolution of the xeq1 and x
eq
2 over θ2 (arbitrary unit). p1 = 6, p2 = 2 (arbitrary units),
θ1 = 0, welfare-maximizing agent.
3.3 Case 2: The Bulgarian situation
During the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009, the transit of Russian gas to
Europe was cut for nearly two weeks. By far the most serious consequences were observed
in the Balkans where some countries experienced an emergency situation, with parts of
the population unable to heat their homes.8 On top of the intense emotion created by this
quasi-humanitarian crisis, this event reactivated a debate on the regulatory reforms needed
for those countries.
In the Balkans, the regulatory framework of the natural gas industry is undergoing radical
reforms with the aim of implementing the EU legislation on energy and competition.9 A
8An early description of these consequences can be found in Pirani et al. (2009, p. 53-56)
9This is the explicit goal of the Southeast Europe Energy Community Treaty that came into force on
July 1, 2006.
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separation between regulated infrastructure-related activities and retail activities similar
to the one currently at work in Western Europe is expected.
Some pertinent insights for the natural gas market can be obtained from our model. Until
now, the Bulgarian gas industry has been dominated by Bulgargaz Plc, the state-owned
gas company, which holds a monopoly on the transmission and distribution of natural gas
throughout the country.
There is currently an increasing concern about potential threats to the security of gas
supply for this country in the coming decade. In fact, Bulgaria is characterized by a
huge dependence upon imports from a single large supplier (Russia) and the country's gas
demand is expected to grow strongly alongside its economic transition. As a result, there
is a sound debate about the possibility of creating new import infrastructures that would
connect Bulgaria and other Southeast European countries to new sources of gas located
either in the Caspian area or in Western Europe. Given the huge uncertainties attached
to these projects, it is worthwhile to consider a benchmark scenario based on a continuing
total dependence on Russian imports.
Thanks to the previous model, this case is relatively easy to analyze as follows. Here, we
assume that n retailers are competing to serve the Bulgarian gas market. These ﬁrms have
a reduced choice and can only purchase their gas from a unique producer: Gazprom, the
Russian gas company. Hence, with our notations, the sets I and J are I = {1, 2, ..., n}
and J = {1}. Let us denote by xi the amount of natural gas bought by the ﬁrm i. x0
denotes also the total quantity sold by the producer x0 =
∑n
i=1 xi and θ the probability
that Russia cuts its production, either for technical, economical or political reasons. The
price charged by the producer is p, the elasticity values for the short- and long-run demands
are respectively 1 = 0.3 and 0 = 1.2.10 Besides, we give arbitrary values for the other
exogeneous parameters: a = 1 and p = 1 in arbitrary units. We assume that in case of
disruption, there are some "force majeure" provisions that allow the import of gas from
neighboring countries. We will denote by c this minimum gas quantity in Bulgaria in the
event of disruption. The maximization problem can thus be written for each ﬁrm i:
Max (f(x0)− p)xi − θ xix0
∫ x0
c
g(x0, t)dt+ θpxi
xi ≥ 0
(25)
We denote by Π each ﬁrm's proﬁt: Π(xi) = (f(x0)− p)xi − θ xix0
∫ x0
c
g(x0, t)dt+ θpxi.
Assuming that the natural gas demand takes an iso-elastic functional form, we have
Π(xi) = ax
− 1
0
0 xi
(
1− θ 1
1 − 1
)
+ θa
1
1 − 1c
− 1
1
+1
xix
1

−1
0 − p(1− θ)xi (26)
We can show that the function Π(xi, xj , j 6= i) where the variable is xi and xj , j 6= i are
considered constant is concave. The existence and uniqueness of an optimum for each ﬁrm
is thus guaranteed.
To simplify our expressions, we call
α = a
(
1− θ 1
1 − 1
)
(27)
10The review of empirical studies presented in Hoel and Strøm (1987) supports this assumption of an
elasticity value greater than one for the long-run price elasticity of the natural gas demand in a European
country.
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β = θa
1
1 − 1c
− 1
1
+1
(28)
The ﬁrst-order conditions calculation gives:
∂Π
∂xi
(xi) = αx
− 1
0
−1
0
(
x0 − xi
0
)
+ βx
1

−2
0
(
x0 +
(
1

− 1
)
xi
)
− p(1− θ) (29)
Appendix 2 gives the technical study of the dependence of the gas volume and price in the
Bulgarian market over the problem's parameters.
Figure 7 gives the evolution of the natural gas price in the market, over the number of
retailers n, for θ = 0.15 and c = 0.4 in arbitrary units.
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Figure 7:
Evolution of the gas price in the market over n. θ = 0.15, and c = 0.4 in an arbitrary
unit.
As expected, the price decreases with the number of retailers as stringent competition leads
to cheaper products and smaller proﬁts. We notice that the price converges towards a ﬁnite
value p∞, that can be calculated. For this purpose, we need to study the convergence of
the sequence nxeq(n) when n −→∞. This study is carried out in Appendix 3.
Figure 8 shows how p∞ evolves with θ for c = 0.4 (arbitrary unit). We already know
that in the case of completely secure supply (i.e. θ = 0), the standard pure and perfect
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competition study allows us to assert that the market price converges towards the pro-
ducer's price p when n is large enough. Our model arrives at the same conclusion: indeed,
when θ = 0, we can easily calculate p∞(0) = p.
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Figure 8:
Evolution of p∞ (arbitrary unit) over θ. c = 0.4 in an arbitrary unit.
The conclusion we can draw from the pure and perfect competition situation is quite in-
teresting: if the alternative imports capacity is low enough (which is quite realistic for
the current Bulgarian situation) and the number of trading ﬁrms is large, insecure sup-
plies make the gas retail price higher than the import price, which obviously decreases the
consumers utility, even if consumers are compensated if disruption occurs. This indicates
that, added to the "oligopolistic margin", there exists a "security margin" charged by the
retailers to compensate the disruption costs they have to support in case of supply failure.
This "security margin" increases with the disruption risk θ. This study illustrates how the
disruption costs are passed along to consumers: the consumer surplus is thus a decreasing
function of the disruption risk.
As far as retailers' proﬁt is concerned, we can prove that the industry's total expected
proﬁt is nought and does not vary with θ. A formal proof of this result is given in Ap-
pendix 5. Therefore, the total revenue derived from the non-negative diﬀerence between
import and retail price is exactly equal to the expected total disruption cost. As a result,
the national welfare of this importing country is a decreasing function of the disruption
probability θ.
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Figure 9 gives the evolution of the price over the disruption probability θ for n = 6 and
c = 0.4 in arbitrary units.
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Figure 9:
Evolution of the gas price in the market (arbitrary unit) over θ. n = 6 and c = 0.4 in an
arbitrary unit.
The price increases with the probability θ because if the supplier is not secure, the retailers
need to charge a high natural gas price in order to ensure their long-run proﬁt, so that
they can compensate the loss due to any disruption, which can occur quite frequently.
Let us study now the impact of any disruptive behavior on the gas amount imported to the
Bulgarian market. We also study the possibility of controlling the market by a national gas
regulator. In this paper, we assume the existence of an eﬃcient social welfare maximizing
regulator that has a perfect information on contract prices, disruption probabilities and
disruption costs.11 Among the large set of possible regulatory instruments (e.g. imposing
the ﬁrms to hold some precautionary storage), we focus on a possible regulatory interven-
tion on the ﬁrms' contracting decisions. More speciﬁcally, let us assume that a possible
regulation ﬁxes a maximum amount X bought by each retailer i, in order to optimize the
expected social welfare (shared between the retailers and the consumers).
11Thus, we do not model the principal-agent interactions between the regulator and the regulated ﬁrms.
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We denote by W the total social welfare:
W = Wconsumers +Wretailers
where
Wconsumers =
∫ x0
0 f(t)dt− f(x0)x0 Consumer surplus
Wretailers =
∑n
i=1
(
(f(x0)− p)xi − θ xix0
∫ x0
c
g(x0, t)dt+ pθxi
)
Retailers' proﬁts
(30)
Under the iso-elasticity assumptions, we can calculate analytically welfareW if the quantity
of gas bought by each retailer xi is x:
W (x) = τn−
1
0
+1
x
− 1
0
+1 + βn
1
 x
1
 − np(1− θ)x (31)
where
τ = a
(
0
0 − 1 − θ
1
1 − 1
)
(32)
β = θa
1
1 − 1c
− 1
1
+1
. (33)
Figure 10 represents the evolution of the welfare over the quantity bought by each retailer
x for θ = 0.15, n = 6, and c = 0.4 in arbitrary units.
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Figure 10:
Evolution of the social welfare over x (arbitrary units). θ = 0.15, n = 6, and c = 0.4
(arbitrary units).
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We notice that there is an optimal amount xmax to be bought by each retailer to ensure a
maximum welfare. We will now compare this quantity to the one imported by the retailers
if they were to interact freely without any regulation. Figure 11 gives the evolution of xmax
and xeq over θ for n = 6 and c = 0.4 in arbitrary units. We notice that there is a speciﬁc
disruption probability θlim, that depends only on the inner-market characteristics (i.e. 0,
1, n, c, a and p) such as:
if θ ≤ θlim xeq ≤ xmax
if θ > θlim xeq > xmax
(34)
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Figure 11:
Evolution of xeq and xmax (arbitrary units) over θ. n = 6 and c = 0.4 (arbitrary unit).
The main conclusion to draw from this study is the following: to optimize the social wel-
fare, a regulator should ﬁx a maximum amount X sold by Gazprom to the Bulgarian
retailers only if the risk of disruption is high: θ > θlim. In that case, the maximum
amount X must be xmax(θ). No regulation should be imposed if the producer is not too
risky (i.e. θ ≤ θlim) for any restriction on the gas amount would decrease the social welfare.
At this stage of our model, it is interesting to study the evolution of the probability θlim,
that is the regulation determining factor, over the alternative import capacity amount c.
Economically speaking, it is easy to predict that this probability increases with c. Indeed,
if the alternative gas import capacity is high in the event of an emergency, it is possible to
tolerate frequent disruptions, without any regulation. Figure 12 represents the evolution
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of θlim over the capacity c, for n = 6, p = 1 and a = 1 in arbitrary units.
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Figure 12:
Evolution of θlim over c (arbitrary unit). n = 6.
We notice that the probability θlim converges, for large capacities towards a ﬁnite value
θ∞ that depends only on 0, 1, a and p. In our example, θ∞ ≈ 0.5. The main conclusion
to draw is that for very risky producers (θ > θ∞), a regulation of import volumes must
always be imposed in order to optimize the social welfare regardless of the alternative
import amount c.
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4 Concluding remarks
The main goal of this paper is to study the impacts on the natural gas market of supply
disruption risks. For that purpose, we develop a static model (over a typical period of
one year) based on a Cournot game between diﬀerent retailers who buy gas from possibly
risky producers and bring it onto the market. The previous models found in the literature
do not take into account the current economic situation of the energy markets in Europe,
because they assume a pure and perfect competition structure. Since their liberalization,
an oligopolistic description that takes into consideration market powers exerted through
the gas chain is more suitable to study the European natural gas markets. In our model,
the upstream market is represented as follows: the retailers sign long-term contracts with
producers (e.g. Gazprom) that ﬁx the selling gas price. We take into account the recent
market liberalization by assuming that all the retailers have the same access to transport
means. We also suppose that producers sell their gas at the same price to all the retail-
ers. In the downstream market, the retailers interaction is modeled by a Cournot game,
with an assumption of market transparency, when all the actors maximize their expected
proﬁt, taking into consideration speciﬁc disruption costs they have to pay to consumers
in case of supply interruption from risky producers. Disruption costs can be quantiﬁed by
introducing a short-run demand function. We were able to study in details some partic-
ular Western European markets by making an iso-elasticity assumption on the long- and
short-run inverse demand functions.
The German gas market of the 1980s, which is represented by the interaction between
one big retailer, Ruhrgas AG, who brings gas to the end-user market and two big produc-
ers, Russia and Norway, has been described accurately by our model. We have shown in
particular that if the Russian gas becomes too expensive or too risky (compared to the
Norwegian gas, which is supposed to be safe) with bounds that can be precisely determined
and that depend only on the inner market characteristics, no Russian gas would be brought
to Germany by Ruhrgas AG as this would decrease its proﬁt. We also show that the price
charged by Ruhrgas in the German market would increase with the disruption probability.
The Bulgarian gas market is also a case analyzed thanks to our model: we assume the
existence of a certain number of retailers that buy gas mostly from one risky producer:
Gazprom. The main conclusions we can draw from our study are the following: Firstly,
the gas price in the market, in case of pure and perfect competition, is higher than the pro-
ducer's price, which is the pure and perfect competition gas price in the market if Russia is
considered to be a safe supplier. This indicates that, added to the "oligopolistic margin",
there exists a "security margin" charged by the retailers to compensate the disruption costs
they have to support in the event of supply failure. This "security margin" increases with
the disruption risk. Secondly, we show that, under some speciﬁc assumptions on the local
force majeure supplies, the pure and perfect competition price increases with the Russian
disruption probability. Finally, we show the existence of a threshold probability such as if
the disruption probability is greater than the threshold, it is better, for the overall social
welfare to regulate the market (by means of quantities control) and not leave the actors to
interact freely.
The results of this paper are obtained by assuming the predominance of disruption costs
in a ﬁrms' decisions, thereby a negligible role is thus given to the alternative crisis man-
agement techniques: strategic withdrawal from existing natural gas storages, alternative
short-term imports, re-routing of existing gas ﬂows, increased production from other sup-
pliers that may compensate the shortfall of others. Following the impressive disruptions
that occurred in Eastern Europe, concerns about the security of supply are now back at
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the top of the policy makers' agenda. The identiﬁcation of the optimal measures to be
implemented in the short-run to cope with a disruption is still an on-going issue. As a
result, future research could expand the framework discussed in this paper in order to
identify optimal crisis management policies.
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Appendix 1
In this appendix, we calculate the partial derivative of Π¯i with respect to the decision
variable x0ik. This derivative is the sum of three terms:
∂A
∂x0ik
, ∂B
∂x0ik
and ∂C
∂x0ik
with:
∂A
∂x0ik
= f ′(x0)
∑
j∈J
x0ij + f(x
0)− pk (35)
∂C
∂x0ik
= pk
∑
{ω∈Ω\{0},k∈Sω}
θ(ω) (36)
The partial derivative of B with respect to x0ik, is a little bit more subtle to calculate. In
fact, the collection of events ω has to be separated in two subsets depending on whether
the particular producer k cuts its supplies under the state ω or not. We can write:
∂B
∂x0ik
= −
∑
{ω∈Ω\{0},k /∈Sω}
θ(ω)
∂DCi(x0, ω)
∂x0ik
−
∑
{ω∈Ω\{0},k∈Sω}
θ(ω)
∂DCi(x0, ω)
∂x0ik
(37)
Let us consider a particular producer k and buyer i. The distinction among the two cases
is important since the partial derivative of DCi(x0, ω) with respect to x0ik takes a diﬀerent
literal expression in the two cases. If under a given state ω ∈ Ω\{0}, the particular
producer k cuts its supplies (i.e. k ∈ Sω), then the amount x0ik is both present in the
overall disrupted volumes (x0 − xω) as well as in i's disrupted purchases ∑j∈J(x0ij − xωij).
In the other case (when k does not cut its production), both the overall disrupted quantities
(x0 − xω) and ∑j∈J(x0ij − xωij) become independent on the variable x0ik. Moreover, in the
latter case, the integral boundaries can be manipulated so as to avoid any dependence on
x0ik.
If k ∈ Sω,
∂DCi(x0, ω)
∂x0ik
=∑
(l,j)∈I×J
(
x0lj − xωlj
)
l 6=i
(x0 − xω)2
∫ x0
xω
g(x0, t)dt+
∑
j∈J
(
x0ij − xωij
)
x0 − xω
(∫ x0
xω
∂g
∂k
(x0, t)dt+ f(x0)
)
(38)
Whereas if k /∈ Sω, we have a simpler expression:
∂DCi(x0, ω)
∂x0ik
=
∑
j∈J
(
x0ij − xωij
)
x0 − xω
(∫ 0
xω−x0
∂g
∂k
(x0, t+ x0)dt
)
.
(39)
Appendix 2
In this appendix, we theoretically solve the retailers' optimization problems given in for-
mulation 25 of section 3.3.
Market transparency is an inherent assumption to our model (i.e. we assume that the
n retailers have the same knowledge of the market in terms of prices and probability of
disruption). Furthermore, mathematically speaking, we notice that the optimization prob-
lem 25 is symmetric for all the retailers. Consequently, we can already predict that the
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Nash-Cournot equilibrium is reached when all the amounts xi are equal. Hence, let us call
xeq the equilibrium quantity bought by each retailer and use the ﬁrst-order condition to
ﬁnd it. We can deduce an implicit function that gives xeq (i.e. a relation between xeq and
the problem's parameters) from expression 29:
αn
−1− 1
0
(
n− 1
0
)
x
− 1
0
eq + βn
1

−2
(
1

− 1 + n
)
x
1

−1
eq − (1− θ)p = 0 (40)
Actually, it is not possible to ﬁnd general analytical expressions of the solution for 40. We
will use numerical means to solve it. However, we can already predict that equation (40)
has a unique solution. Indeed, ∀n ∈ N∗ the function
gn : x −→ αn−1−
1
0
(
n− 1
0
)
x
− 1
0 + βn
1

−2
(
1

− 1 + n
)
x
1

−1 − (1− θ)p
is strictly decreasing on R∗+ and realizes a bijection from R∗+ to R.
If we assume that an equilibrium is possible, we can calculate the price of the product in
the market and study its dependence on the disruption probability θ and the number of
retailers n.
price = a(nxeq)
− 1
0 (41)
Appendix 3
This appendix studies the price behavior in the pure and perfect competition context p∞.
Let us denote ρn = nxeq(n). Using equation 40 we deduce that ρn is the unique solution
of
fn(ρn) = α
(
1− 1
n0
)
ρ
− 1
0
n + β
(
1
 − 1
n
+ 1
)
ρ
1

−1
n − (1− θ)p = 0
Let us call f the function: R∗+ −→ R
f : x −→ αx− 10 + βx 1−1 − (1− θ)p
f is a decreasing function and realizes a bijection from R∗+ to R. Let us call ρ = f−1(0)
the unique solution of the equation f(x) = 0 and let us show that ρn −→ ρ. Indeed, we
have fn(ρn)− f(ρ) = 0. Hence ∀n ∈ N∗:
α
(
ρ
− 1
0
n − ρ−
1
0
)
+ β
(
ρ
1

−1
n − ρ 1−1
)
=
1
n
(
α
0
ρ
− 1
0
n + β
(
1

− 1
)
ρ
1

−1
n
)
(42)
We can show easily that ∃M ∈ R∗+ such as ∀n ∈ N∗ |ρn| < M (that is to say the
sequence ρn is boundned). Using equation 42, we conclude that α
(
ρ
− 1
0
n − ρ−
1
0
)
+
β
(
ρ
1

−1
n − ρ 1−1
)
−→ 0 when n −→∞. Hence:
f(ρn) −→ f(ρ)
f being a continuous bijective function, f−1 is also a bijective continuous function and we
conclude that ρn = f−1(f(ρn)) −→ f−1(f(ρ)) = ρ.
Finally, we can write the price limit p∞:
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p∞ = aρ
− 1
0 (43)
Using relation αρ
− 1
0 + βρ
1

−1 = (1− θ)p, we can calculate
dρ
dθ
(θ) =
−p+ 11−1aρ
− 1
0 − 11−1ac
1− 1
1 ρ−
1

−1
− 10αρ
− 1
0
−1 + β
(
1
 − 1
)
ρ
1

−1
=
−1
θ
1
− 10αρ
− 1
0
−1 + β
(
1
 − 1
)
ρ
1

−1
(
p− aρ− 10
)
.
(44)
If we assume that the force majeure imports capacity c is low enough, such as c <( p
a
)−0  11−11 = 1.67 ( pa)−0 , we can show (see Appendix 4) that
∀θ ∈ [0, 1] p ≤ aρ(θ)− 10 . (45)
Hence, in this situation we conclude that ∀θ ∈ [0, 1] dρdθ (θ) ≤ 0, or
∀θ ∈ [0, 1] dp∞
dθ
(θ) ≥ 0. (46)
On the contrary, if c >
( p
a
)−0  11−11 , we show that (see Appendix 4):
∀θ ∈ [0, 1] dp∞
dθ
(θ) ≤ 0. (47)
Appendix 4
In this appendix, we show the properties stated in Appendix 3:
if c <
(p
a
)−0

1
1−1
1 then ∀θ ∈ [0, 1] p ≤ aρ(θ)−
1
0
and if c >
(p
a
)−0

1
1−1
1 then ∀θ ∈ [0, 1] p ≥ aρ(θ)−
1
0
• We assume c < ( pa)−0  11−11
Let us suppose that ∃θ0 ∈ [0, 1[ such as p ≥ aρ(θ0)−
1
0 . Using equation 44, we have
dρ
dθ (θ0) > 0. We deﬁne θ1 as follows:
θ1 = sup{θ ∈ [θ0, 1[ / dρdθ (θ) > 0}
and let us show that θ1 = 1. If θ1 < 1, since the function θ −→ ρ(θ) is continuously
derivable, we can conclude that dρdθ (θ1) = 0. Using equation 44 we ﬁnd that p =
aρ(θ0)
− 1
0 . However, we know that ∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ1[ dρdθ (θ) > 0. Hence, the function
θ −→ ρ(θ) is strictly increasing on the set [θ0, θ1[ and ρ(θ1) > ρ(θ0). We already
have p ≥ aρ(θ)− 10 . Thus we ﬁnd
p ≥ aρ(θ0)−
1
0 > aρ(θ1)
− 1
0 = p (48)
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which is absurd. Then θ1 = 1 and we conclude that dρdθ (1) > 0 or
p > aρ(1)−
1
0 . (49)
We can quite easily calculate ρ(1):
ρ(1) = c
1
1−1
1 (50)
and using the condition c <
( p
a
)−0  11−11 , we ﬁnd that:
aρ(1)−
1
0 > p (51)
which is absurd, regarding equation 49.
Hence:
∀θ ∈ [0, 1] p ≤ aρ(θ)− 10 (52)
• We assume c > ( pa)−0  11−11
Hence, aρ(1)−
1
0 < p and dρdθ (1) > 0. We intend to show that ∀θ ∈ [0, 1] aρ(θ)
− 1
0 <
p. If we assume that ∃θ0 ∈ [0, 1[ such as aρ(θ0)−
1
0 ≥ p, we call θ1 the probability:
θ1 = inf{θ ∈ [θ0, 1[ / dρdθ (θ) ≥ 0}. (53)
Here again, since the function θ −→ ρ(θ) is continuously derivable, we have dρdθ (θ1) =
0 . However, we know that ∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ1[, dρdθ (θ) ≤ 0. Hence, ρ(θ1) < ρ(θ0). However,
we already have:
p = aρ(θ1)
− 1
0 > aρ(θ0)
− 1
0 ≥ p (54)
which is absurd. Thus our conclusion.
Appendix 5
In this appendix, we show that the retailers' proﬁt in the Bulgarian market is equal to 0,
in the situation of pure and perfect competition. We will use the notation of Appendix 3.
The retailer's total proﬁt is:
Πtot =
∑
i
Πi = nΠ(xi) (55)
where the individual proﬁt Π(xi) is given in equation 26. Hence:
Πtot = αρ
− 1
0
+1 + βρ
1
 − (1− θ)pρ (56)
31
where α and β have been deﬁned in section 3.3 and the variable ρ in Appendix 3.
We already know (Appendix 3) that ρ is such that f(ρ) = 0, where the function f is deﬁned
in Appendix 3. It is easy to notice that:
Πtot = ρf(ρ) (57)
Therefore:
Πtot = 0 (58)
Thus our conclusion.
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